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CANDIDATE CONSERVATION AGREEMENTS UNDER 
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: PROSPECTS AND 
PERILS OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERIMENT 
Martha F. Phelps* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Endangered Species Act (ESA or the Act) has been called the 
pit bull of environmental legislation·. l The United States Supreme 
Court has stated that, through the ESA, Congress intended to give 
endangered species the highest of priorities, calling the Act "the most 
comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species 
ever enacted by any nation.''2 However, the rigidity of the ESA is both 
its greatest strength and its greatest weakness. '!\vo decades of strict 
judicial enforcement of the ESA have built resentment and resistance 
from ranchers, developers, and private property rights advocates.3 
The backlash against the ESA following the controversy over the 
Northern Spotted Owl in the old-growth forests of the Pacific North-
west4 has given encouragement to states and private industries trying 
to broker agreements with the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service5 (FWS or 
* Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1997-1998. 
The author would like to thank Professor Zygmunt J.B. Plater and others who were instrumen-
tal in the researching of this Comment. 
1 See Eric Fisher, Comment, Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species 
Act: No Surprises & the Quest/or Certainty, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 371, 371 (1996). 
2 See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174, 180 (1978). 
3 See, e.g., David Seideman, Out o/the Woods, AUDUBON, July-Aug. 1996,66,67. 
4 See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 692 
(1995). 
6 The ESA gives authority to the Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, 
overland and freshwater species, and to the Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, National Marine Fisheries Service, over marine species. 50 C.F.R. 
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the Service) to keep their endangered species off the list.6 For exam-
ple, in 1995, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt signed an agree-
ment with Governor Roy Romer of Colorado.7 The agreement allows 
Colorado to develop and implement its own plans to protect endan-
gered and threatened species throughout the state, by encouraging 
voluntary compliance from private property owners, municipalities, 
and Indian nations.8 In exchange, Coloradans will be subject to less 
of what many see as the additional restrictions on land use imposed 
by the ESA.9 
In 1992, the Service reinstituted a previously abandoned policy to 
guide FWS officials in entering into these agreements, known as 
Candidate Conservation Agreements or Conservation Agreements, 
with states and private parties as a way to allow states to protect 
their own species and keep them off the federal list.lO In November 
1994, the FWS developed a draft guidance document (hereinafter 
Draft Guidance) on candidate species, which included guidance on 
Conservation Agreements; and in June 1997, the Service announced 
a draft policy for Candidate Conservation Agreements in the Federal 
Register.ll Although parties to these Conservation Agreements must 
abide by the agreed-upon conservation plans, the plans are typically 
devised with competing interests in mind.12 Conservation Agreements 
§ 17.2 (1995). For the purposes of this Comment I will refer only to the FWS as the acting 
Service involved in ESA decisions. 
6 See, e.g., Andrew Melnykovych, Save the Copperbelly, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), 
Sept. 4, 1996, at llA; Governor Romer and Secretary Babbitt Outline Unprecedented Federal-
State Partnership Under Endangered Species Act, News Release, Nov. 29, 1995, at *1; available 
in 1995 WL 705351 (D.O.I.) [hereinafter D.O'!. News Releasel. 
7 See Gary Gerhardt, New Way to Save Species: Plan to Save Threatened Wildlife Could 
Become U.S. Model, Officials Say, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Nov. 30, 1995, available in 1995 
WL 10620166. 
B [d. 
9 See D.O.I. News Release, supra note 6. The Secretary stated for the public, "Our aim is to 
prevent the listing of species. However, if species must be listed ... [tlhis agreement will take 
the sting out of the listing process." [d. 
10 Telephone interview with Susan Lawrence, Division of Endangered Species, U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Service (Feb. 13, 1997); RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
DIVISIONS, UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Endangered Species: Factors 
Associated with Delayed Listing Decisions, 9 [hereinafter GAO Reportl. 
11 Division of Endangered Species, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Draft, Endangered Species 
Program: Candidate Species Guidance, 13-18 (Nov. 1994) (on file with the author) [hereinafter 
Draft Guidancel; Announcement of Draft Policy for Candidate Conservation Agreements, 62 
Fed. Reg. 32,183 (1997). 
12 For example, Colorado Governor Roy Romer has said, "[ w le have lost sight of the impor-
tance of protecting species and yet do so in a way that does not seriously infringe on property 
rights and economic growth." D.O.I. News Release, supra note 6, at *1. 
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are only enforceable under contract law by the parties to the agree-
ment, and do not carry the force of the ESA, a comprehensive piece 
of federal legislation under which any interested party can petition 
for listing or bring a suit for enforcement.13 
The FWS bases its authority for Conservation Agreements on 
several provisions of the Act, all of which seem questionable at best 
in terms of authorizing private agreements to avoid listing. Addition-
ally, the decisions of the FWS not to list otherwise endangered or 
threatened species based on the existence of a Conservation Agree-
ment are subject to administrative law analysis under Chevron, 
U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 14 Although 
judicial review of agency decisionmaking is typically highly deferen-
tial, there has been an increase in judicial activity in this area since 
Chevron. The FWS's interpretation of the ESA as authorizing the use 
of Conservation Agreements to obviate a need to list endangered or 
threatened species may not be considered reasonable if challenged.16 
Finally, in using these agreements to avoid listing, the FWS may be 
violating the intent of Congress in creating the ESA by evading the 
spirit if not the letter of the Act.16 
This Comment examines recent use of Conservation Agreements 
by the FWS to substitute for listing endangered or threatened spe-
cies. Section II of the Comment focuses on the listing process and the 
protections afforded endangered and threatened species under the 
ESA. Section III briefly relates the background and use of Conserva-
tion Agreements and describes the legal mechanism that allows a 
Conservation Agreement to circumvent the listing process. Section 
IV describes some administrative law doctrine and case law applica-
ble to Conservation Agreements. Finally, Section V argues that Con-
servation Agreements are not authorized by the ESA, evade the 
spirit if not the letter of the Act, and violate administrative law 
doctrine and procedure. 
II. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
The purpose of the ESA is to "provide a means whereby the eco-
systems upon which endangered species and threatened species de-
13 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A) (1994); 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g). 
14 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703 (1995) 
(citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984». 
16 See discussion infra Section V.B. 
16 See discussion infra Section V.C. 
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pend may be conserved, [and] to provide a program for the conserva-
tion of such endangered species and threatened species."17 The legis-
lative history surrounding the ESA is meager but clear.18 Congress 
passed the statute at a time when species were being lost at the rate 
of one per year, a pace that was accelerating rapidly.19 Additionally, a 
statement to Congress by the Assistant Secretary of the Interior 
revealed that humans and human technological advances were the 
direct cause of many extinctions.20 Rising public sentiment surround-
ing endangered species and the growth of the environmental move-
ment further influenced Congress to act.2i In this context, and believ-
ing that species biodiversity held unknown scientific and medical 
benefits for humankind, Congress passed the ESA in 1973.22 The 
Supreme Court has stated that ''the language, history, and structure 
of [the ESA] indicates beyond doubt that Congress intended endan-
gered species to be afforded the highest of priorities."23 The ESA's 
main strength is in its protective provisions against actions of federal 
agencies and against the "taking" of individual members of a species.24 
Additionally, the Act provides for the assessment of civil and criminal 
penalties against those who violate the ESA.26 These protective and 
enforcement provisions apply to species that have been officially listed 
by the Service as endangered.26 
A. Listing 
To list a species as endangered or threatened, the Secretary of the 
Interior (Secretary), or his or her designee, the Service, must first 
determine that the animal or plant in question fits the statutory 
definition of a species.27 According to the ESA, a species "includes any 
subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct population 
segment [DPS] of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which 
17 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). 
18 See DANIEL J. ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A GUIDE TO ITS PROTECTIONS 
AND IMPLEMENTATION, at 23-24 (1989); see also S. REP. No. 93--307, at 252 (1973), reprinted in 
1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989. 
19 Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,176 (1978). 
2°ld. 
21 See ROHLF, supra note 18, at 22-25. 
22 See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 177-79. 
23 See id. at 174. 
24 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536,1538 (1994). 
25 See id. § 1540. 
26 See id. § 1533. 
27 See id. 
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interbreeds when mature."28 Whether a population is considered a 
DPS depends upon discreteness and significance of the population in 
relation to the remainder of the species to which it belongs.29 
Any interested party may petition the Service for a proposal to list 
a species as endangered or threatened.30 An endangered species is one 
that is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion 
of its range.31 A threatened species is one that is likely to be in danger 
of extinction throughout all or some of its range within the foresee-
able future.52 Within ninety days of receiving such a petition, the 
Secretary is required, "to the maximum extent practicable," to deter-
mine whether the petition presents enough scientific or commercial 
data to meet the threshold test, a finding that the listing may be 
warranted.sa If the Secretary finds that the listing may be warranted, 
he or she is to promptly begin a status review of the species in 
question.54 If the Secretary determines that the listing of a species 
may be warranted, he or she has twelve months from the date of 
receiving the original petition to make a determination on listing the 
species.35 In addition, if the Secretary finds that there is a question as 
to the data relevant to a listing decision, he or she may extend the 
twelve-month period by six months for the purpose of soliciting more 
data.36 The Act explicitly requires that any regulations promulgated 
under it shall comply with the notice and comment rulemaking re-
quirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).37 This means 
that general notice of proposed rulemaking must be published in the 
Federal Register.38 Practically speaking, any time the Service wishes 
to propose a species for listing, it must publish a summary of the 
information relevant to the proposal in the Federal Register.39 
In determining whether a species is qualified for threatened or 
endangered status, the Secretary is bound to consider only the best 
28 [d. § 1532 (16). 
29 See Policy Regarding the Recognition of Distinct Vertebrate Population Segments Under 
the Endangered Species Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 4722, 4725 (1996). 
30 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1994). 
31 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6). 
32 See id. § 1532(20). 
33 See id. § 1533(b)(3)(A). 
34 [d. 
35 See id. § 1533(b)(3)(B). 
36 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(B)(i). 
87 See id. § 1533(b)(4); 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994). 
88 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). 
89 [d. 
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scientific and commercial data available.40 The statute lays out five 
factors that the Secretary may consider in determining whether a 
species is threatened or endangered: "(A) the present or threatened 
destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range; (B) 
overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational 
purposes; (C) disease or predation; (D) the inadequacy of existing 
regulatory mechanisms; or (E) other natural or manmade factors 
affecting its continued existence."41 
Courts have held that the Secretary's determination regarding a 
potentially endangered or threatened species is limited to considera-
tion of these five factors.42 Specifically, courts have held that the 
Secretary may not take into account the possibility of future conser-
vation plans for a species when making a listing decision.43 In South-
west Center for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, for example, plaintiffs 
sued the Secretary to challenge a decision that a proposal to list the 
Queen Charlotte goshawk was not warranted.44 The United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia found that in determining 
whether to list the goshawk, the agency relied on a promise from the 
Forest Service that the Forest Service would "address land manage-
ment options to ensure goshawk habitat conservation."45 In invalidat-
ing the Service's decision on the goshawk listing, the court stated that 
the Service may not take promises of proposed future actions to 
protect a species into account when determining a listing, in the 
absence of an existing plan.46 Significantly, however, the court went 
further than it needed to go and stated explicitly, "[c]learly, if the 
Forest Service had an existing plan that would protect the goshawk 
to the standards required by the ESA, then FWS would not have to 
enact its own plan," by listing the species as endangered or threat-
ened.47 
In another case a few weeks later based on similar facts, the same 
court used the same reasoning to reach the same result.48 In Biodi-
versity Legal Foundation v. Babbitt, plaintiffs prevailed on a theory 
40 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A). 
41 See id. § 1533(a)(l). 
42 See, e.g., Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 839 n.12 (6th Cir. 1981). 
43 See, e.g., Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Babbitt, 943 F. Supp. 23, 26 (D. D.C. 1996); Southwest 
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 939 F. Supp. 49, 52 (D. D.C. 1996). 
44 See Southwest Ctr., 939 F. Supp. at 50. 
46Id. at 51. 
46Id. at 52. 
47 See id. 
48 See Biodiversity Legal Found., 943 F. Supp. at 26. 
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that the Secretary should not be able to rely on a future, unimple-
mented promise of the Forest Service when making a determination 
on listing of the Alexander Archipelago wolf.49 As in Southwest C en-
ter, however, the court held in dicta that an existing plan of the Forest 
Service that afforded protections to the wolf would be relevant to a 
listing decision. 60 
In addition, at least one court has held that the Secretary may not 
be influenced by political factors in his or her decision.51 In Save Our 
Springs v. Babbitt, the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Texas held that the Secretary's decision not to list the 
Barton Springs salamander was invalid, in part because he was sub-
ject to political pressure in the decisionmaking process.52 This same 
court also held that the Secretary violated the ESA when he consid-
ered a Conservation Agreement in making his listing decision.53 
The Secretary has an affirmative duty to officially list any species 
or DPS determined by the Service to be endangered or threatened.54 
Courts have found that Congress intended the Secretary's duty to list 
a species in these circumstances to be mandatory, not discretionary.56 
In Pacific Legal Foundation v. Andrus, for example, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the legislative 
history of the ESA indicated that Congress intended the duty to list 
to be mandatory.56 The court concluded that because Congress in-
cluded a provision in the Act that exempted the Secretary from 
compulsory listing of certain insect pests, Congress did not intend the 
duty to list to be discretionary. 57 
The Service also may list a species that is subject to "any emer-
gency posing a significant risk to [its] well being" under an emergency 
listing provision.68 The emergency listing provision allows the Service 
to list the species immediately without adhering to the notice and 
comment rulemaking provisions of the APA59 or the ESNs own time 
frame for publishing notice of proposed and final rules in the Federal 
49 Id. at 23, 26. 
60 See id. at 26. 
61 See Save Our Springs v. Babbitt, No. MO-96-CA-168 (W.n. Tex. Mar. 25,1997). 
62 Id., slip op. at 18. 
63 Id. 
64 See, e.g., Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 839 (6th Cir. 1981). 
66 Id. 
MId. 
67Id. at 839 n.12. 
68 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(7) (1994). 
69 5 U .S.C. § 553. 
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Register.60 To get around these provisions the Service must publish 
with the regulation detailed reasons why the emergency listing is 
necessary, and give actual notice of the emergency listing to authori-
ties in those states where the species occurs.61 The listing will be 
effective upon immediate publication of the rule in the Federal Reg-
ister, and will last for 240 days.62 The 240-day period gives the Service 
a chance to go through the standard (non-emergency) listing proce-
dure for the species if the listing is to be permanent.63 
B. Substantive Protections 
Once the Service has listed a species or DPS as endangered, a 
number of substantive protections apply under the ESA immediately. 
For example, concurrent with listing a species, the Secretary must 
also designate critical habitat for that species.64 According to the 
definitions section of the statute, critical habitat means: 
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by 
the species, at the time it is listed ... on which are found those 
physical or biological features I) essential to the conservation of 
the species and II) which may require special management con-
siderations or protection; and 
(ii)specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the 
species at the time it is listed ... upon a determination by the 
Secretary that such areas are essential for the conservation of the 
species.56 
The Secretary does have some discretion in the designation of critical 
habitat.66 The statute requires only that the Secretary designate such 
habitat "to the maximum extent prudent and determinable."67 How-
ever, courts have held that the Service has a duty to designate critical 
habitat concurrently with listing.68 
For example, in Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Washington held that the 
60 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(7). 
61 [d. 
62 [d. 
63 See id. (extending period of protection if Secretary complies with regular listing proce-
dures). 
64 16 U .S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A). 
65 [d. § 1532 (5)(A). 
66 See id. § 1533(a)(3)(A); Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96, 104 (D.D.C. 1995). 
67 16 U .S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A). 
68 See, e.g., Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, 625-29 (W.D. Wash. 1991) 
(interpreting prudent and determinable exceptions). 
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Secretary had abused his discretion by not designating critical habitat 
for the spotted owl concurrently with its listing.69 The court held that, 
absent extraordinary circumstances, the designation of critical habi-
tat must coincide with the final listing decision on a species.70 Once a 
species has had critical habitat designated for it, the species is subject 
to the additional protections involving critical habitat in section 7, 
discussed in more detail below. 
The Secretary must create a recovery plan "for the conservation 
and survival of" all listed species.71 The recovery plan is designed to 
be a ''basic road map to recovery," enumerating the specific steps 
needed to get the species from the brink of extinction back to a 
healthy population that can eventually be delisted.72 Courts have held 
that the duty to create a recovery plan is mandatory under the stat-
ute, although there is no time limit imposed in which the Secretary 
must come up with the plan.73 
For example, in Oregon Natural Resource Council v. Turner, the 
United States District Court for the District of Oregon held that 
although the Secretary is required to develop and implement a recov-
ery plan for each listed species, the ESA allows the Secretary to 
establish a priority system for these plans.74 The priority system gives 
the Secretary ''broad discretion to allocate scarce resources to those 
species that he or she determines would most likely benefit from 
development of a recovery plan."75 The court went on to hold explicitly 
that the statute imposes no time constraint on the Secretary in devel-
oping and implementing recovery plans.76 
N either the statute nor the regulations promulgated under it pro-
vide guidelines for drawing up a recovery plan. However, a typical 
plan includes a report on the current status of the species; threats to 
the species' survival; specific actions needed to conserve the species 
and the means for implementation; and a target population at which 
the species could be delisted.77 
69 Northern Spotted Owl, 758 F. Supp. at 629. 
70 See id. at 626, 629. 
71 16 U.S.C. § 1533(0. 
72 See Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96, 103 (D.D.C. 1995). 
73 See, e.g., Oregon Natural Resource Council v. 'furner, 863 F. Supp. 1277, 1279-80 (D. Or. 
1994). 
74 [d. at 1283. 
75 [d. 
76 [d. 
77 See ROHLF, supra note 18, at 87--88. 
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Section 7 of the Act protects listed species against threatening or 
potentially harmful acts of government agencies.78 This section pro-
vides two specific protections for endangered species: federal agencies 
may not jeopardize the continued existence of the species, and may 
not destroy or adversely modify the species' critical habitat.79 The 
United States Supreme Court has stated that the requirements of this 
section are mandatory and binding on all federal agencies: 
One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose 
tenus were any plainer than those in § 7 of the Endangered 
Species Act. Its very words affinnatively command all federal 
agencies "to insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out 
by them do not jeopardize the continued existence" of an endan-
gered species or "result in the destruction or modification of habi-
tat of such species .... " This language admits of no exception.so 
The ESA does not define "jeopardize," but the Secretary has prom-
ulgated regulations stating that "'jeopardize the continued existence 
of' means to engage in an action that reasonably would be expected, 
directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the 
survival and recovery of a listed species in the wild by reducing the 
reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that species."81 According to 
Professor Rohlf, the no-jeopardy provision is one of the most fre-
quently applied substantive protections in the ESA.82 
Once a species has had critical habitat designated for it, all federal 
agencies have an affirmative duty to ensure that any actions under 
their control ("authorized, funded, or carried out by" a federal agency) 
do not destroy or adversely modify the critical habitat.&'l The land-
mark case Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill involved a section 7 
violation by the TVA, and in this case the United States Supreme 
Court established the restriction as absolute, saying: 
[M]andatory provisions of section 7 were not casually or inadver-
tently included .... [S]ection 7 reveals an explicit congressional 
decision to require agencies to afford first priority to the declared 
national policy of saving endangered species. The pointed omis-
78 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1994). 
79 [d. 
80 Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978) (citation omitted) (quoting 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1536). 
81 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1996). 
82 See ROHLF, supra note 18, at 148. 
83 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
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sion of the type of qualifying language previously included in 
endangered species legislation reveals a conscious decision by 
Congress to give endangered species priority over the "primary 
missions" of federal agencies.84 
Another protection for endangered species under the ESA is found 
in section 9 of the Act.85 Section 9 prohibits a number of activities 
involving endangered and threatened species, including the import or 
export, sale or receipt in interstate or foreign commerce, possession 
or transport, or taking of any species.86 According to the definitions 
section of the statute, "to take" means "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, 
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in 
any such conduct."87 According to the regulations accompanying the 
ESA, the definition of "harm" includes "an act which actually kills 
or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modifica-
tion or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by sig-
nificantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, 
feeding or sheltering."86 The United States Supreme Court has upheld 
the Secretary's interpretation of the term "harm" as expressed in 
these regulations, which includes habitat modification in the definition 
of "harm," and hence in "take."89 
Section 10 of the Act allows for a broad exception to the protections 
of section 9.90 According to section 10, the Secretary can grant an 
"incidental take permit," which authorizes any "take" referred to in 
section 9, as long as the take is incidental to and not the purpose of 
the otherwise lawful activity.91 Before receiving such a permit, how-
ever, the party seeking the permit must prepare and submit a conser-
vation plan laying out specific effects likely to occur as a result of the 
planned activity, and specific procedures for minimizing and mitigat-
ing those effects.92 
84 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 183-85. 
85 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a). 
86 [d. 
87 [d. § 1532 (19). 
88 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1995). 
89 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 707-08 (1995). 
90 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(I)(B). 
91Id. 
92 [d. § 1539(a)(2). 
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C. Enforcement 
Section 11 of the ESA provides for civil and criminal penalties to 
be assessed against those in violation of the Act.93 The Secretary can 
impose civil penalties of up to $10,000 per violation on someone who 
knowingly violates any of the provisions of the Act.94 An unknowing 
violation of any provision may cost a person up to $500 per violation 
in civil penalties.95 The Secretary must provide notice and opportunity 
for a hearing prior to the assessment of any fines.96 The Act also makes 
provisions for the Secretary to bring a civil action against a person 
who fails to pay the penalty assessed.97 
Section 11(b) of the Act provides for penalties for criminal viola-
tions of any of the provisions of the Act.98 Upon conviction, a person 
may be fined as much as $20,000 or imprisoned for not more than one 
year, or both.99 
Section 11(g) of the Act provides for citizen suits against violators 
of the Act, including the government.100 According to the provision, 
any person may bring a civil suit on her own behalf 1) to enjoin a 
person or a government official or agency alleged to be in violation of 
the Act; 2) to compel the Secretary to apply the prohibitions against 
takings of listed species; or 3) to compel the Secretary to perform any 
nondiscretionary act or duty under section 4.101 
The citizen suit provisions of the ESA provide an important func-
tion in allowing individuals to act as watchdogs by bringing suit to 
compel the Secretary to list species that have been deemed endan-
gered or threatened, to designate critical habitat for species that have 
been listed, and to make final determinations on whether to list spe-
cies in the statutory time limit, for example.102 The citizen suit provi-
sions also play an instrumental role by allowing citizens to bring suit 
and get injunctions against potential violators of the Act.1°S 
93 [d. § 1540. 
94 [d. § 1540(a). 
95 16 V.S.C. § 1540(a)(l). 
96 [d. 
97 [d. 
98 [d. § 1540(b)(1). 
99 [d. 
100 16 V.S.C. § 1540(g)(1). 
101 [d. 
102 [d. 
103 See ill.; see also ROHLF, supra note 18, at 182. 
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The Act's three strongest features, listing, protections, and enforce-
ment, work together in a strategy devised by Congress to afford strict 
protection to species.104 Two of these features, listing and protections, 
have been held to be mandatory. lOG The third feature, enforcement, 
allows private citizens to act as watchdogs over the Service and sue 
for listing of species or violations of the Act.106 These three features 
together make up a comprehensive statutory scheme that as a whole 
is stronger than the sum of its parts. Newer protective measures 
designed by the FWS, such as the Conservation Agreement, reduce 
the protections offered to species by retaining only one of these three 
features of the E SA, substantive protections.107 Conservation Agree-
ments leave species unlisted and hence not subject to any protective 
measures not specifically enumerated in a Conservation Agreement. 
As private agreements, they are enforceable only through suits in 
court and only by the parties to the Agreement; such suits may not 
represent effective or efficient enforcement. 
III. CONSERVATION AGREEMENTS 
A. How and Why Conservation Agreements Developed 
The FWS began using Conservation Agreements (CAs) in the early 
1980s, officially phased them out in 1985, and reintroduced them in 
1992.108 Since the internal Draft Guidance document came out in N 0-
vember 1994, the FWS has used CAs increasingly as a substitute for 
listing. 
The number of species officially listed and awaiting implementation 
of recovery plans is unmanageable.109 Because the Act provides that 
104 See ROHLF, supra note 18, at 25. 
106 See Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 839 (6th Cir. 1981); Northern Spotted Owl 
v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, 626 (W.D. Wash. 1991). 
106 16 U.S.C. § 1540. 
107 See generally Copperbelly Water Snake Conservation Agreement and Strategy, Dec. 5, 
1996 (on file with the author) [hereinafter CWS Agreement]; Barton Springs Salamander 
Conservation Agreement and Strategy, Aug. 13, 1996 (on file with the author) [hereinafter BSS 
Agreement]; Virgin Spinedace Conservation Agreement & Strategy, Apr. 11, 1995 (on file with 
author) [hereinafter VS Agreement]. 
108 GAO Report, supra note 10, at 9. However, the report notes that during the period when 
the FWS had discontinued the policy of using Conservation Agreements as an alternative for 
listing, at least two CAs were developed, for the Bruneau Hot Springsnail and the Jemez 
Mountain Salamander. See id. at 9-10. The GAO report notes that both these CAs were also 
inconsistent with FWS's policy and guidance. [d. 
109 See Thd R. Hamachek, Endangered Species Act Failing Its Mission, THE SEATTLE TIMES, 
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the Service can prioritize the species according to those that will 
benefit most from implementation of a recovery plan, there are a 
growing number of species that may languish and finally disappear 
completely after a length of time on the list with no improvement in 
their status. Additionally, the Service is constrained by appropria-
tions.110 Not every species on the list is guaranteed funding for its 
recovery plan.111 The prioritization system for appropriations works 
in the same way, and a significant percentage of species on the list 
may never be helped for lack of funds. 
The backlash against the ESA following the controversy over the 
Northern Spotted Owl in the old-growth forests of the Pacific North-
west has manifested itself as a general antagonism to the E SA among 
private property owners.ll2 Individuals, industry leaders, and state 
and federal politicians have lent their voices to the growing movement 
against ESA protection for species.ll3 From this perspective, protec-
tive provisions to save species are nothing more than unwanted gov-
ernment regulation of private property-in the worst-case scenario, 
unconstitutional "takings" of private property by the government.ll4 
For example, U.S. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, R-Texas, who 
sponsored the ultimately successful bill imposing a year-long morato-
rium on listing, said at the time that she hoped it would "prevent 
further erosion of private property rights."116 Upon her re-election, 
she stated that she expected the new Congress to implement changes 
to the ESA that would reverse "the regulatory harassment of our 
small businesses."116 Representative Helen Chenoweth, R-Idaho, has 
become notorious for her harsh criticisms of the ESA, and has called 
the environmental movement "[t]his religion, a cloudy mixture of 
New Age mysticism, Native American folklore and primitive earth 
worship ... [, which] is being promoted and enforced by the Clinton 
Nov. 21, 1993, at B9. Hamachek states that as of 1993, almost one-half of all listed species were 
awaiting recovery plans.Id. 
I1°Id. 
l11Id.; see also Mark o. Hatfield, A Hollow Saboon Plan Means Politics as Usual, THE 
SEATTLE 'liMEs, May 20, 1994, B7. 
112 See Robert H. Nelson, Shoot, Shovel, and Shut Up, FORBES, Dec. 4, 1995,82. 
113 See, e.g., Seideman, supra note 3, at 67. 
114 See Nelson, supra note 112, at 82. 
115 David Parrish, Environmental Dilemma: Central Valley Farmers United in Fight Over 
Endangered Species Laws that Impact Water Availability, Land Rights, L.A. DAILY NEWS, 
Mar. 19, 1995, available in 1995 WL 5389881. 
116 David Jackson, GOP Lawmakers Must Deliver, Hutchison Says, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
Nov. 10, 1994, available in 1994 WL 6867023. 
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administration in violation of our rights and freedoms."U7 Sig-
nificantly, then Senator William S. Cohen of Maine made his antago-
nism toward the ESA clear in threats to withhold his vote for re-
authorization of the Act if the Services approved a petition to list the 
Atlantic salmon throughout its historic range.UB In letters to Secre-
tary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt and Commerce Secretary Ron 
Brown, the Senator stated: "[t]he disposition of this petition will 
greatly affect my views regarding ... changes to the Endangered 
Species Act that might be warranted."u9 
The year-long moratorium on listing and delays in implementing 
recovery plans for listed species because of administrative and fund-
ing backlogs contributed to the belief within the Service that an 
alternative to listing that would protect species was desirable.120 The 
public and political opposition to the ESA has made the Secretary and 
the Service more willing to take part in cooperative efforts at conser-
vation with the states.121 The Conservation Agreement is a prime 
example of this new willingness to allow states and private parties to 
have more input and more influence in listing decisions. 
B. Internal Policy on CAs 
According to a 1993 report of the General Accounting Office (GAO), 
the policy within the FWS on using CAs in lieu of listing has varied 
since 1983.122 The GAO report states that the FWS adopted a policy 
117 Bill Lambrecht, Whose Earth Is It, Anyway? ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 21, 1996, 
available in 1996 WL 2764133. 
118 Telephone interview with D.C. "Jasper" Carlton, Director, Biodiversity Legal Found. (Feb. 
10, 1997). Ironically, because Sen. Cohen was later appointed as Secretary of Defense, he did 
not get a chance to make good on his threat-at least not directly. 
119 Andrew Kekacs & Clayton Beal, Salmon May Get U.S. Protection, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, 
Mar. 15, 1995, available in 1995 WL 5819837; see also Andrew K. Weegar, Did Politics Sink the 
Salmon Listing?, MAINE TIMES, Mar. 30, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8258562. Indeed, following 
the Spotted Owl case, the ESA became such a political hot button that then-President George 
Bush relied on anti-environmental sentiment in his campaign against President Clinton. In a 
campaign stop in the Northwest in 1992, Mr. Bush called the ESA a "sword aimed at the jobs, 
families, and communities of entire regions like the Northwest." Seideman, supra note 3, at 67. 
Even the backlash itself has not been immune to political mud-slinging. Vice President Al Gore 
has said that Republicans in general are engaged in a jihad against the environment. Nelson, 
supra note 112, at 82. One hopes that Mr. Gore's evocation of a holy war against infidels was 
unintentional. 
120 Telephone interview with Toni Ann Baca, Southwest Regional Solicitor's Office, Dep't of 
the Interior (Feb. 10, 1997). 
121 Telephone interview with Paul Nickerson, Chief, Division of Endangered Species, U.S. Fish 
& Wildlife Service (Jan. 27, 1997). 
122 See GAO Report, supra note 10, at 9. 
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in 1983 allowing the use of CAs in lieu of listing, where the CA 
effectively removed all threats to the species that would otherwise 
warrant listing.l23 This policy contemplated that a CA so relied upon 
would be in place at the time that a listing decision was required by 
statute.l24 However, this policy was discontinued as of 1985, and a new 
policy for CAs was not instituted until February 1992.126 Following 
November 1994, FWS officials were working in compliance with draft 
guidance on CAs.126 The Draft Guidance was announced to the public 
and public comments were sought on it as of December 1994.127 No 
formal policy or regulation has yet been promulgated by the FWS, 
but in June 1997, the Service announced a new draft policy in the Fed-
eral Register (hereinafter Draft Policy).l23 And according to Leslie 
Dieroff, Policy Coordinator, Albuquerque Regional FWS Office, the 
FWS is working on developing a formal policy on CAs and hopes to 
have a policy guidance document finalized soon.129 According to the 
FWS, "[t]he Service characterizes conservation agreements as posi-
tive opportunities for landowners and managers to voluntarily take 
actions to conserve species being considered for listing and alleviate 
the need for listing and any resulting regulatory requirements."l30 
The June 1997 Draft Policy describes Candidate Conservation 
Agreements as "a collaborative approach for the conservation of pro-
posed and candidate species, or species likely to become candidate or 
proposed species in the near future."lSl A candidate species, according 
to the FWS, is one "for which the FWS has sufficient information on 
file relative to status and threats to support issuance of a proposed 
listing rule."l32 The document describes a CA as: 
123Id. 
IIMId. 
126Id. 
128 Telephone interview with Susan Lawrence, supra note 10. 
127 See Draft Guidance for Candidate Species Under the Endangered Species Act for Review 
and Comment, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,780 (1994) (notice of availability Dec. 21, 1994); Announcement 
of Draft Policy for Candidate Conservation Agreements, 62 Fed. Reg. 32,183 (1997). 
123 Telephone interview with Leslie Dieroff, Policy Coordinator, Division of Endangered Spe-
cies, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (Feb. 11, 1997). 
128Id. 
lao See Determination of Endangered Status for Three Wetland Species Found in Southern 
Arizona and Northern Sonora, Mexico, 62 Fed. Reg. 665, 670 (1997). 
131 Announcement of Draft Policy for Candidate Conservation Agreements, 62 Fed. Reg. 
32,183, 32,184 (1997). 
132Id. at 32,186. 
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an Agreement signed by either Service, or both Services jointly, 
and a property owner, and any other cooperator, if appropriate, 
or with a State or local land management agency, that: (a) Sets 
forth specific management activities that the private or non-Fed-
eral property owner, or State or local land management agency, 
will voluntarily undertake to conserve the covered species; (b) 
specifies management activities that are adequate to remove the 
need to list the covered species, if such actions were undertaken 
by other property owners similarly situated within the range of 
the species; and (c) for agreements with assurances, provides 
the property owner or State or local land management agency 
with the Candidate Conservation assurances described within the 
Agreement. l33 
The Draft Policy distinguishes between Candidate Conservation 
Agreements without assurances and Candidate Conservation Agree-
ments with assurances.134 A CA with assurances "would provide as-
surances that, if covered species are eventually listed, the property 
owners or agencies [that are parties to the CAl would not be required 
to do more than those actions agreed to in the Candidate Conserva-
tion Agreement"; these assurances are "guaranteed" through the is-
suance of an incidental take permit for continuing land management 
activities that is dated as of the date of listing of any of the covered 
species.l35 The assurances are provided, at least in part "as a way 
of rewarding [the private parties'] proactive voluntary conserva-
tion efforts and shielding such persons from any additional restric-
tions which might otherwise affect them if a species is subsequently 
listed. "136 
The stated goal of the Service through Candidate Conservation 
Agreements is "to encourage ... the removal of threats to the covered 
species so as to nullify the need to list them as threatened or endan-
gered under the Act."I37 The Service must be satisfied that the actions 
agreed to in the CA will factor in to a determination of the threats to 
a species in such a way as to do away with the need to list: 
The Services must reasonably expect that the management ac-
tions agreed to and included in any Agreement, if performed by 
all landowners in similar situations, will be adequate to remove 
133 [d. 
134 See id. at 32,183. 
135 [d. 
136 Announcement of Draft Policy for Candidate Conservation Agreements, 62 Fed. Reg. 
32,183, 32,187 (1997). 
137 [d. at 32,185. 
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the threat(s) to proposed, candidate, and species likely to become 
a candidate or proposed species in the near future and are [sic] 
covered by the Agreement, thereby eliminating the need to list 
the covered species. 138 
Additionally, before entering into a Conservation Agreement, the 
Service will be required to make a written finding that "species in-
cluded in such an Agreement will receive a sufficient conservation 
benefit from the activities conducted under the Agreement."139 The 
benefit to the species should be enough to overcome the need for 
listing, and includes specific listed benefits.140 These benefits include a 
reduction in habitat fragmentation rates; restoration and enhance-
ment of habitats; maintenance of or increase in popUlation numbers; 
and reduction of the effects of catastrophic events.141 Finally, the Draft 
Policy states that if the Service cannot agree with the other potential 
parties to the Agreement as to the specific land management actions 
necessary to remove the threat to a species, it will not enter into a 
CA.l42 
Although the primary purpose of the Service's new Candidate Con-
servation Agreement Draft Policy purports to be the stabilization and 
recovery of candidate and proposed species and their ecosystems, 
there is a heavy emphasis on making sure that listing does not become 
a high priority.l43 The subgoals of avoiding administrative backlog, 
avoiding conflict with states and private property owners, and mini-
mizing the costs of recovery are prominently featured in the Draft 
Policy. 144 
C. Anatomy of a Conservation Agreement 
Conservation Agreements are voluntary, private agreements be-
tween the Service and other federal agencies, states, state agencies, 
and private industry members to protect a species.l46 According to the 
Draft Guidance, all CAs "should contain explicit milestones for accom-
138ld. 
189 ld. at 32,187. 
140 ld. 
141 See Announcement of Draft Policy for Candidate Conservation Agreements, 62 Fed. Reg. 
32,183, 32,187 (1997). 
142 See id. 
143 See generally id. 
144 See generally id. 
145 See id. at 14; see also CWS Agreement, supra note 107, at 2-3; BSS Agreement, supra 
note 107, at 1-2. 
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plishment of recovery objectives, as well as identification of funding 
mechanisms."146 A CA should be reviewed at least annually, and may 
be terminated at any time by any of the parties.147 Additionally, the 
CA should be designed to require or promote monitoring of a species' 
status.l48 
A CA usually includes background on the species itself, including a 
description of the status and distribution of the species.149 The back-
ground is followed by sections on problems facing the species and 
conservation actions to be implemented.l50 In some cases the CA may 
explicitly discuss the effect of the agreement in the event of a listing 
decision. 161 
Where other federal statutes, such as the National Environmental 
Policy Act or the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, are 
implicated, a Conservation Agreement will include a section on com-
pliance with the law. l62 Additionally, where actions to be carried out 
under a Conservation Agreement will affect other, listed, species, a 
CA may include a section on incidental takes. l63 
Attached to a CA is an appendix, called a Conservation Strategy, 
which lays out the specifics of the plan for recovery of the species.l64 
In addition, this appendix includes longer sections on background, 
status, and distribution of the species, and discusses in detail the 
threats to the species.l66 Finally, the appendix includes a section on 
the plan's desired outcome.l66 
146 See Draft Guidance, supra note 11, at 17. 
147 [d. 
148 [d. at 18. 
149 See, e.g., CWS Agreement, supra note 107, at 3--4; BSS Agreement, supra note 107, at 2-3; 
VS Agreement, supra note 107, at 3--4. 
160 See CWS Agreement, supra note 107, at 4-5; BSS Agreement, supra note 107, at 4-15; VS 
Agreement, supra note 107, at 4-6. 
151 See, e.g., CWS Agreement, supra note 107, at 6. 
152 See, e.g., BSS Agreement, supra note 107, at 5; CWS Agreement, supra note 107, at 9 
attachment E. 
153 See CWS Agreement, supra note 107, at 9 attachment E. 
154 See CWS Agreement, supra note 107, at 9 attachment A; BSS Agreement, supra note 107, 
at 9 attachment A; VS Agreement, supra note 107, at 12 attachment A. 
156 See id. 
156 See CWS Agreement, supra note 107, at 9 attachment A at 13; BSS Agreement, supra 
note 107, at 9 attachment A at 15; VS Agreement, supra note 107, at 12 attachment A at 15. 
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D. Procedural Matters 
The first step for the FWS in creating a Conservation Agreement 
is to propose the species for listing and publish a notice to that effect 
in the Federal Register.157 As noted above, the FWS then has the 
statutory twelve-month period in which to make a decision on the 
species.l58 This period may be extended by up to six months for the 
Secretary to collect more data relevant to a listing decision.159 Under 
the new Draft Policy, the next step for the FWS is to make the CA 
draft available for public review.l60 The Draft Policy does not state 
how this is to be accomplished in future cases, but in the past this has 
been done, in some cases, through a notice of availability in the Fed-
eral Register.161 In the past, the practice of making draft CAs available 
for public review and comment has not been strictly followed, how-
ever, and since there have been no regulations on CAs, this particular 
procedure has been treated as discretionary.l62 
After a Conservation Agreement has been executed, the next step 
for the FWS is to formally withdraw the proposal to list the species, 
again through a notice in the Federal Register.l63 This notice usually 
mentions the Conservation Agreement as the deciding factor in the 
decision not to list.l64 In pre-Draft Policy cases, if a notice of availabil-
ity had not been published, the public first became aware that the 
FWS had entered into a Conservation Agreement to protect the 
species with the publication of the withdrawal notice. l65 Because the 
167 See, e.g., Proposal to List the Fish Virgin Spinedace as a Threatened Species, 59 Fed. Reg. 
25,875 (1994) (proposed May 18, 1994). 
168 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(A) (1994). 
169 [d. § 1533(b)(6)(B). 
160 See Announcement of Draft Policy for Candidate Conservation Agreements, 62 Fed. Reg. 
32,183, 32,187 (1997). 
161 See, e.g., Draft Conservation Agreement for the Coral Pink Sand Dunes Tiger Beetle, 61 
Fed. Reg. 59,889 (1996) (notice of availability Nov. 25, 1996); Draft Conservation Agreements 
for the Bonneville Cutthroat Trout and the Colorado River Cutthroat Trout, 61 Fed. Reg. 48,500 
(1996) (notice of availability Sept. 13, 1996); Draft Conservation Agreement for the Virgin 
Spinedace, 60 Fed. Reg. 5435 (1995) (notice of availability Jan. 27, 1995). 
162 For example, the Barton Springs salamander and the copperbelly water snake were both 
subjects of Conservation Agreements with the FWS (in the case of the copperbelly, the CA still 
stands); both were proposed for listing, but neither plan was subject to public review and 
comment via a notice in the Federal Register. 
163 See, e.g., Proposed Ru1e to List the Barton Springs Salamander as Endangered, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 46,608 (1996) (withdrawn Sept. 4, 1996); Proposed Rule to List the Fish Virgin Spinedace 
as Threatened, 61 Fed. Reg. 4401 (1996) (withdrawn Feb. 6, 1996). 
164 See id. 
165 See, e.g., Proposed Ru1e to List the Barton Springs Salamander as Endangered, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 46,608 (1996) (withdrawn). 
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proposal to list is withdrawn and the Conservation Agreement itself 
is not the explicit subject of a proposed rule, no final rule on the 
matter is promulgated.l66 
CAs are thus created in reference to a species that has been pro-
posed by the Service for endangered or threatened status.l67 Because 
the species at issue has been proposed for listing, the threats to its 
existence have usually been determined.l68 Hence, the parties (usually 
a state agency or private industry member or both, along with the 
FWS and/or other federal agencies) promise in the CA itself to take 
measures that will reduce the previously determined threats to the 
species such that listing will become unwarranted or less likely to be 
warranted.l69 In this way a CA is factored in to the Service's assess-
ment of threats to a species and acts as an alternative to listing. l70 
The existence of a Conservation Agreement regarding a particular 
species has the ability to change the outcome of a consideration of the 
five factors taken into account in a listing decision. Of the five factors 
that FWS must take into account when considering a listing decision, 
the existence of a Conservation Agreement when fully implemented 
may affect several. l71 In fact, a CA could conceivably affect all of the 
five factors. For example, a CA that addresses strip mining practices 
or restricts strip mining to a relatively limited area could affect the 
first factor-present or threatened destruction, modification, or cur-
tailment of habitat-and also the fifth factor-other natural or man-
made factors affecting the species' continued existence.l72 An Agree-
ment that addresses water resource management in an area where a 
fish is in danger of losing its habitat because of water diversion for 
agricultural practices could be seen as affecting the first factor, as well 
as the fourth and fifth factors.l73 Likewise an agreement addressing 
water quality for a species that is physically isolated to several closely 
grouped springheads and depends upon a constant stream of fresh 
uncontaminated water could be considered to affect the first, fourth, 
and fifth factors.l74 For example, CAs may impose regulations on use 
166 See id. 
167 See BSS Agreement, supra note 107, at 1; VS Agreement, supra note 107, at 1. 
168 See, e.g., Proposal to List the Fish Virgin Spinedace as a Threatened Species, 59 Fed. Reg. 
25,875 (1994) (proposed May 18, 1994). 
169 See CWS Agreement, supra note 107, at 2; BSS Agreement, supra note 107, at 1. 
170 Telephone interview with Scott Pruitt, Biologist, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (Feb. 3, 
1997). 
171 Telephone interview with Ben Jessup, Solicitor's Office, Dep't of the Interior (Feb. 3, 1997). 
172 See, e.g., CWS Agreement, supra note 107, at 9 attachment A at 13. 
173 See, e.g., VS Agreement, supra note 107, at 12 attachment A at 5-7. 
174 See, e.g., BSS Agreement, supra note 107, at 9 attachment A at 4--S. 
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of water resources.176 Often they will include provisions that control 
or manage predator or competitor species that are nonindigenous or 
introduced.176 A key provision of CAs may be habitat designation.l77 
Additionally, CAs may seek to manage potential man-made catastro-
phes, such as toxic SpillS.178 In cases of extreme danger of imminent 
extinction, a CA may provide for the establishment of a captive breed-
ing/refugium program.179 
E. Authority for Conservation Agreements 
In entering into Conservation Agreements with states and private 
parties, the FWS relies exclusively on certain provisions of the ESA 
for authority.180 Conservation Agreements that involve species reliant 
on water invariably cite section 2 for authority.181 This section states, 
in part, "[i]t is further declared to be the policy of Congress that 
Federal agencies shall cooperate with State and local agencies to 
resolve water resource issues in concert with conservation of endan-
gered species."l82 This policy statement appears under the "Congres-
sional findings and declaration of purposes and policy" section of the 
ESA, which is the first section.l83 Another provision cited gener-
ally for authority in Conservation Agreements is section 6(a), which 
states, "[i]n carrying out the program authorized by this chapter, the 
Secretary shall cooperate to the maximum extent practicable with the 
States."l84 The final provision of the ESA cited as authority in Con-
servation Agreements is section 6(c), which states, "In furtherance of 
the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary is authorized to enter into 
a cooperative agreement ... with any State which establishes and 
maintains an adequate and active program for the conservation of 
endangered species and threatened species."186 
175 See, e.g., VS Agreement, supra note 107, at 12 attachment A at 10. 
176 See id. at 12 attachment A at 10-13. 
177 See, e.g., CWS Agreement, supra note 107, at 9 attachment A at 12. 
178 See, e.g., BSS Agreement, supra note 107, at 9 attachment A at 12. 
179 See id. at 9 attachment A at 14-15. 
180 See, e.g., CSW Agreement, supra note 107, at 3; BSS Agreement, supra note 107, at 2; VS 
Agreement, supra note 107, at 3. 
181 See, e.g., BSS Agreement, supra note 107, at 2; VS Agreement, supra note 107, at 3. 
182 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(2) (1994). 
183 [d. § 1531. 
184 [d. § 1535(a). 
185 [d. § 1535(c)(1). 
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F. Enforceability of Conservation Agreements 
A Conservation Agreement is a private contract, and as such is 
enforceable in breach only by the parties to the Agreement or by 
an interested third party who can prove that she is a third-party 
beneficiary.l86 According to Professor Farnsworth, a person who is not 
a party to a contract would have to show that she was an intended 
third-party beneficiary of the agreement in order to have a right to 
enforce the contract.187 To be an intended beneficiary of the agree-
ment, a person would have to meet two requirements: she would have 
to show that 1) "recognition of a right to performance in the bene-
ficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties"; and 
2) "the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the 
beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance."188 
In the case of Conservation Agreements, this means that to sue for 
enforcement of protections afforded under a CA, a person who was 
not a party to the agreement would have to show that the intent of 
the parties was to benefit the public, and that the parties intended to 
make a "gift" of the protections to the public.189 The only real avenue 
for enforcement of Conservation Agreements is by the parties, with 
the incurring of time and money in a lawsuit. In practical terms, the 
enforcement provisions of CAs may be so minimal as to be useless. In 
contrast, under the ESA the Secretary has the authority to assess 
fines, and private citizens can bring suit for enforcement under section 
11. The real threat that FWS holds over parties to the Agreements 
in case of breach is not enforcement through damages or specific 
performance, but rather initiation of emergency listing procedures; 
however, with the addition of "assurances" to a CA, the FWS gives 
up even this tool for enforcing compliance. 
G. Examples of Conservation Agreements 
In April of 1995, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service entered into an 
agreement with the Utah Department of Natural Resources, the 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the National Park Service, the 
Nevada Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, the 
Washington County, Utah, Water Conservancy District, and the Ari-
186 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, § 10.3 (2d ed. 1990). 
187 [d. at 748-49. 
188 [d. at 749. 
189 See id. 
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zona Game and Fish Department, to protect the Virgin spinedace, 
a rare desert minnow.1OO The agreement cited as authority section 
2(c)(2) of the ESA, which reads, "[i]t is further declared to be the 
policy of Congress that Federal agencies shall cooperate with State 
and local agencies to resolve water resource issues in concert with 
conservation of endangered species."I91 The FWS interprets this pol-
icy statement in the statute to mean that the Service has a "special 
obligation" to cooperate with states in applying the E SA. 192 The agree-
ment is accompanied by a conservation strategy for the species, in 
which the various parties layout their plans for funding, implemen-
tation, and oversight of specific actions to protect the spinedace.l93 
The Virgin spinedace, a small minnow, occurs in Utah portions of 
the Virgin River, which begins in Utah, flows through Arizona, and 
empties into Lake Mead on the Colorado River in Nevada.l94 The chief 
threat to the spinedace is habitat modification or destruction through 
dams, water diversion, and agricultural practices.195 The river itself 
and its tributaries are used by local farmers for irrigation, and the 
agreement is seen as a way to "help farmers conserve enough water 
that the ... [r liver's flows are sufficient to reverse the decline" of the 
spinedace. l96 At the time the agreement was made, the late Mollie 
Beattie, then director of the FWS, said that it "obviate[d] the need to 
list a species under the Endangered Species Act."l97 
About a year after the parties implemented the spinedace Conser-
vation Agreement & Strategy, the spinedace population suffered a 
significant setback.198 In the heat of July, a sinkhole swallowed up La 
Verkin Creek, a branch of the Virgin River where the spinedace lives; 
more than five miles of the fish's habitat-mainly on BLM land-were 
completely dried Up.l99 A private landowner using heavy equipment 
made a repair that was unauthorized by BLM, by building a dam and 
190 See VS Agreement, supra note 107, at 2. 
191 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(2) (1994). 
100 Telephone interview with 'Thni Ann Baca, supra note 120. 
198 See VS Agreement, supra note 107, at 12 attachment A at 4-6. 
194 See generally VS Agreement, supra note 107. 
195 See id. at 12 attachment A at 5. 
196 See Mike Gorrell, Can New Approach Save the Minnow?, SALT LAKE ThIBUNE, Feb. 12, 
1996, at DI. 
197 See States Keep Minnow off Endangered List, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Apr. 12, 
1995, at 5B. 
198 See Jim Woolf, Sinkhole Swallows Up Creek, Spits Out Wilderness Controversy, SALT 
LAKE ThIBUNE, Jul. 18, 1996, at AI. 
199 See id. 
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using a plastic pipe to divert the water around the sinkhole.2°O Local 
environmentalists were outraged because of possible damage to the 
surrounding area, and called for sanctions against the renegade re-
pairman.201 The BLM refused to bring charges or assess damages 
against the individual, saying that he went through an approval proc-
ess with another agency and believed he was acting legally.202 How-
ever, the question remains whether the emergency repairs harmed 
the fish or were vital to the fish's survival because of their timeliness. 
It took officials a month to come up with a plan for repair of the creek, 
and six weeks longer for actual implementation.203 
On August 13, 1996, the FWS entered into an agreement with the 
Texas Parks & Wildlife Department, the Texas Natural Resource 
Conservation Commission, and the Texas Department of Transporta-
tion to protect the Barton Springs salamander, an endangered aquatic 
salamander whose range is limited to several closely located springs 
in Austin, Texas.204 The species was proposed for listing in February 
of 1994 and was the subject of a lawsuit between then and August of 
1996, when the CA was announced.205 After extending deadlines for 
listing several times, and developing the CA with the state of Texas, 
the FWS withdrew the proposed rule to list the salamander as endan-
gered.206 
Like the Virgin spinedace, the Barton Springs salamander popula-
tion suffered a setback after the implementation of the agreement.207 
The agreement was entered into in August of 1996; in December of 
that year, twelve salamanders were found dead in a spring near the 
Barton Springs pool shortly after the pool had been cleaned.208 The 
next month, sixteen more dead salamanders were discovered, again 
after the pool was cleaned.209 Officials soon discovered the cause of the 
200 See id. 
201 See id.; see also Jim Woolf, Sinkhole that Drains Creek to Be Plugged, SALT LAKE 
TRIBUNE, Aug. 13, 1996, at BI. 
2<rl Woolf, supra note 201, at BI. 
203 Id. 
204 See BSS Agreement, supra note 107, at 1-2. 
206 See Ralph K.M. Haurwitz, Inaction Imperils Species, Suit Says, AUSTIN AMERICAN-
STATESMAN, Oct. 21, 1995, at BI. 
206 See Proposed Rule to List the Barton Springs Salamander as Endangered, 61 Fed. Reg. 
46,608 (1996) (withdrawn Sept. 4, 1996). 
207 See Ralph K.M. Haurwitz, Salamanders Alive, Barton Pool Clean after New Procedure, 
AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Jan. 24, 1997, B8. 
208 See Texas, Feds Spar over Salamanders: Deaths Renew Endangered-Species Debate, 
DENVER POST, Jan. 17, 1997, at A28. 
209 See Haurwitz, supra note 205. 
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deaths: city crews had allowed a nearby spring to dry up when they 
drained the Barton Springs pool in the cleaning process.210 The loss of 
twenty-eight salamanders is potentially fatal to the population, ac-
cording to D.C. "Jasper" Carlton, director of the Biodiversity Legal 
Foundation in Colorado; about forty-five salamanders were believed 
to make up the entire population earlier in 1996.211 
In March of 1997, however, Save Our Springs and Dr. Mark Kirk-
patrick won a victory against the Secretary of the Interior in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.212 In 
Save Our Springs v. Babbitt, Judge Lucius D. Bunton III denied 
defendant's motion for summary judgment and ordered the Secretary 
to reconsider the listing decision on the salamander.218 The court found 
that the Conservation Agreement was the reason the Secretary de-
cided not to list the salamander, and that "strong political pressure 
was applied to the Secretary to withdraw the proposed listing of the 
salamander.'1214 The court also found that the Secretary did not follow 
the notice and comment procedures required by the APA in consid-
ering the Conservation Agreement.216 Because the Secretary consid-
ered a CA as the primary factor in the listing decision, was in-
fluenced by political forces, and violated both the ESA and the APA 
by disallowing public comment, the judge struck down the Conserva-
tion Agreement as invalid, saying: 
When the Secretary permitted an Agreement, with no proven 
track record for effectiveness in protecting the species, to play the 
pivotal role in his listing decision and when he considered political 
factors in making his listing decision, he acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously. Any listing decision that considers the Conservation 
Agreement will be deemed by this Court to be arbitrary and 
capricious until sufficient time has elapsed to permit the Secre-
tary to determine its effectiveness in protecting the species. This 
Court considers a sufficient track record to be two years. If the 
Secretary then determines the Agreement will be effective in 
eliminating the threats to the species, he can delist the species-if 
in fact it has been listed. The Secretary's reliance on facts outside 
the record coupled with the inability of interested persons to 
210 See id. 
211 Telephone interview with D.C. "Jasper" Carlton, supra note 118; see Thxas, Feds Spar over 
Salamanders, supra note 208, at A28. 
212 See Save our Springs v. Babbitt, No. MO-96-CA-168 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 25,1997). 
218 [d., slip op. at 20. 
214 [d., slip op. at 7, 11. 
216 [d., slip op. at 8. 
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participate and comment on relevant matters critical to the final 
decision to withdraw the listing was not in compliance with the 
AP A and ESA.216 
In ruling for the plaintiffs, the judge gave the Secretary 30 days to 
make a decision on the salamander, and when the Secretary requested 
a 120-day deadline extension, the judge summarily denied it.217 
Political pressure also came to bear on the Secretary following the 
decision in district court: Texas Governor George W. Bush accused 
the Secretary of a ''breach of trust," when informed of his decision not 
to appeal, and issued a statement that "Texans will have a hard time 
trusting a federal government that makes an agreement, then turns 
right around and breaks it."218 The case has finally resulted in a posi-
tive listing decision for the Barton Springs salamander, although en-
vironmentalists still fear for the species because of the allowances for 
development that were built in to the final rule.219 
At the time of this writing (October 31, 1997), no further informa-
tion is available about the fate of the Virgin spinedace or the Barton 
Springs salamander. 
IV. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO AGENCY DECISIONMAKING 
The decisions of the FWS, as are all agency decisions, are subject 
to review under doctrines and procedures of administrative law. The 
amount of deference a court will pay to an agency decision can make 
the difference in whether a decision will ultimately be upheld. In 1984 
the United States Supreme Court heard arguments in Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.220 The claim 
involved a regulation promulgated under the Clean Air Act by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).221 The regulation allowed 
states to define the statutory term "stationary source" to mean an 
entire plant containing many different kinds of pollution-emitting 
devices (a ''bubble'') for the purposes of determining the total produc-
216 Id., slip op. at 18. 
217 See Salamanders: Judge Denies Extension for Listing Decision, Greenwire, Apr. 18, 1997. 
218 See Scott S. Greenberger, Salamander Listing Im't Breach of Trust with Texas, Feds Say, 
AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Apr. 25, 1997; Ralph K.M. Haurwitz, Salamander Will Be on 
Endangered List, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Apr. 23, 1997, AI. 
219 See Final Rule to List the Barton Springs Salamander as Endangered, 62 Fed. Reg. 23,377 
(1997); see also Ralph K.M. Haurwitz, Salamander Rule Soothes Developers; Environmentalists 
Are Agitated, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, May 1, 1997, AI. 
220 467 U.S. at 837 (1984). 
221Id. at 840. 
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tion of emissions.222 The Natural Resources Defense Council chal-
lenged EPA's authority to promulgate the regulation. The Supreme 
Court held that if Congress's intent as to a matter of statutory inter-
pretation is clear, the agency must adhere to that intent.223 Where, 
however, the "statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 
specific issue," the agency must base its interpretation on a permissi-
ble construction of the statute.224 The Court continued its reasoning, 
saying that an explicit gap left by Congress may be filled by an agency 
interpretation that is not arbitrary, capricious, or "manifestly con-
trary to the statute."225 An implicit gap, on the other hand, may be 
filled by an agency interpretation that is based on a reasonable inter-
pretation of the statute.226 The Court upheld the agency interpretation 
of the Clean Air Act, stating that a challenge based on whether a 
regulation was wise policy, and not whether it was a reasonable inter-
pretation, must fail. 227 
The case seemed to found a modern legacy of judicial deference to 
agency policymaking.228 However, commenters note that even in 
Chevron, the Supreme Court did not grant an extremely strong level 
of deference to the agency.229 Since Chevron, the Supreme Court has 
increasingly backed away from even this level of deference, in an 
attempt to reassert some of the judicial power that Chevron seemed 
to deny.230 
In 1995, the United States Supreme Court interpreted Chevron in 
the context of the ESA, in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Com-
munities for a Great Oregon.231 Sweet Home involved a regulation 
promulgated under the ESA concerning the definition of "take" in 
section 9 of the Act.232 The Secretary included "harm" in the definition 
of "take," and "significant habitat modification" in the definition of 
''harm.''233 A group of small landowners, logging companies, and fami-
222 Id. 
223 Id. at 84~. 
Z24 Id. at 843. 
226 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 866. 
228 See Theodore L. Garrett, Judicial Review after Chevron: The Courts Reassert Their Role, 
10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T. 59, 59 (1995). 
229 Id. 
230 See Simona Papazian, Comment, Sweet Home's Effect on the Chevron Doctrine and the 
Increased Role of the Judiciary in Reviewing Agency Statutory Interpretations, 7 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L. J. 543, 544 (1996). 
231 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
232 Id. at 687-88. 
233 Id. at 687. 
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lies dependent on the timber industry in the Pacific Northwest chal-
lenged the regulation.234 The Supreme Court held that the Secretary's 
definition of "take," which included habitat modification, was justified 
by three separate textual points of the Act.235 First, the Court held 
that an ordinary understanding of the word "harm," as found in a 
dictionary, supported the view that habitat modification that results 
in actual injury or death qualifies as "harm.''236 Next, the Court found 
that the broad purpose of the Act weighed in favor of the Secretary 
protecting species against the exact type of harms that the Act was 
intended to address.237 Finally, the Court said, the language of the 
1982 amendment regarding incidental take permits showed that Con-
gress intended to protect species from indirect as well as direct 
harm.238 
Commenters have argued that Sweet Home has weakened the 
Chevron standard of review by placing less emphasis on Congres-
sional intent, in effect regaining a stronger role for the courts in 
reviewing agency statutory interpretation.239 If this is so, it means 
that the Court will have more say in future challenges to agency 
authority in the context of the Endangered Species Act. 
V. ANALYSIS 
The FWS relies on explicit statutory provisions within the ESA 
itself to provide authority for Conservation Agreements.24o However, 
the provisions it uses to justify the use of private agreements in lieu 
of listing are either vague policy statements regarding cooperation 
with states or clear mandates to the Service to cooperate with the 
states in carrying out the ESA.241 The vague policy statement about 
cooperating with state and local authorities to resolve water resource 
issues needs to be read in the context of the Act, which commands 
the Secretary to list and offer protections to endangered species.242 
Since the species subject to CAs are not listed species, the FWS is 
not acting pursuant to the ESA in creating these agreements, and 
234 See id. at 692. 
230 [d. at 697. 
236 See 515 U.S. at 697. 
237 [d. at 698. 
238 [d. at 700-{) 1. 
239 See, e.g., Papazian, supra note 230, at 544. 
240 See, e.g., CWS Agreement, supra note 107, at 3; BSS Agreement, supra note 107, at 2; VS 
Agreement, supra note 107, at 3. 
241 16 U.S.C. §§ 1535(a), (c) (1994). 
242 See id. § 1531(c)(2). 
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therefore cannot rely for authority on provisions whose underlying 
premise is the carrying out of the mandate of the ESA.243 As a result, 
the provisions that the FWS recites do not provide adequate author-
ity for using CAs as a mechanism to avoid listing. 
The decision of the FWS to use CAs in lieu of listing is subject to 
a Chevron review.244 The language in the statute and in the legislative 
history seems clear and unambiguous on its face-Congress did not 
intend for the Service to have discretion to make agreements to avoid 
listing.246 Even if a court would find that Congress left an implicit gap 
for the agency to fill in, however, it would probably find that the 
Service's action was not based on a reasonable interpretation of the 
Act.246 
Finally, Conservation Agreements violate the intent of Congress. 
By adhering narrowly to the letter of the law in a number of areas, 
the FWS carefully avoids a myriad of legal challenges on already-de-
cided points of law. The adherence is so narrow, however, as to indi-
cate that in implementing these agreements the FWS evades the 
spirit if not the letter of the E SA. These issues are considered in more 
detail below. 
A. ESA Does Not Authorize CAs 
Conservation Agreements may be void for lack of authority.247 The 
general language of section 2(c)(2) implies that Congress did not want 
endangered species issues to exacerbate water resource issues.248 
However, it is unlikely that Congress intended this to mean that the 
FWS was authorized to go outside the statute to deal with endan-
gered species that were in potential conflict with water resource 
needs. In fact, the section refers to resolving water resource issues 
"in concert with conservation of endangered species."249 This wording 
refers explicitly to endangered-and hence listed-species. Even if 
Congress intended the Service to have discretion to create private 
agreements with states, this section does not authorize such agree-
ments to substitute for listing. The provision must be read in the 
248 See iii. §§ 1535(a), (c). 
244 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
246 See iii. at 842-43. 
246 See iii. at 844. 
247 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(c)(2), 1535(a), (c). 
248 See iii. § 1531(c)(2). 
249 [d. 
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larger context of the ESA, which provides a specific mandate to the 
Secretary to list and implement protective measures for endangered 
and threatened species. Because the Legislature intended the duty to 
list to be mandatory, it would be counter-intuitive to interpret this 
provision to mean that the Secretary had the discretion to create a 
private agreement that could then be used in the analysis to effect a 
negative outcome on a listing decision. 
The language of section 6(a) at first seems to give the Secretary 
broad discretion for interpretation.250 However, in executing private 
Conservation Agreements, the Secretary is not "carrying out the 
program authorized by this chapter," since the program authorized 
by the chapter is the ESA, and Conservation Agreements provide a 
way around the ESA. From the language of this provision, it would 
appear that Congress intended that the Service work in cooperation 
with the states when carrying out the provisions of the ESA.261 Since 
Conservation Agreements technically serve as a way around the re-
quirements of the ESA, and the species protected by them are not 
subject to protection under the ESA, Congress probably did not 
intend that this provision would be used to avoid listing a species. 
Again, section 6(c) could perhaps be seen as a general authorization 
for the Secretary to enter into agreements with states; on closer 
inspection, this provision refers specifically to states that maintain 
conservation programs for endangered and threatened species.262 The 
statute has defined "endangered species" to mean a species in danger 
of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range, and 
"threatened species" to mean a species that is likely to become an 
endangered species within the foreseeable future.263 Additionally, the 
Act has been held by courts to specifically command the Secretary to 
list such species.264 Therefore, in creating this provision, Congress was 
almost certainly contemplating that the FWS could enter into "coop-
erative agreements" with states that had implemented their own 
protections for federally listed (and hence endangered or threatened) 
species. Key to the survival and legality of Conservation Agreements 
is the fact that the Secretary has deemed the species protected by the 
260 See id. § 1535(a) (stating that "the Secretary shall cooperate to the maximum extent 
practicable with the states"). 
251 See id. 
252 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c). 
253 [d. § 1532. 
254 See Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 839 (6th Cir. 1981). 
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Agreement not endangered or threatened-and hence not in need of 
listing.266 Given this, one could argue that in creating this provision of 
the Act, Congress contemplated a much different form of cooperative 
agreement, and certainly one that did not supplant the listing require-
ment. 
B. Decision to Use CAs Violates Chevron 
Under a Chevron analysis, a court would first ask whether Con-
gress had spoken directly on the issue of whether using CAs to avoid 
listing is permissible.266 If Congress has spoken directly on an issue, 
the court and the agency must give effect to Congressional intent.267 
In this case, there is support in the language of the statute as well as 
the legislative history for the argument that Congress spoke directly 
on the issue. Congress made the duty to list an endangered or threat-
ened species mandatory.268 This indicates that Congress did not intend 
for the agency to have discretion to distinguish from among endan-
gered species those that would benefit most from listing and only list 
those. The mandatory duty to list also suggests that an agency is not 
free to create agreements to fine-tune the listing factors in favor of 
not listing. Congress clearly intended that those species that the 
agency deemed to be endangered or threatened would be listed.269 
The fact that Congress explicitly provided for cooperative agree-
ments with states that maintain programs for protecting listed spe-
cies also supports the argument that Congress did not sanction Con-
servation Agreements.260 Congress envisioned the agency entering 
into a certain type of agreement with states, and the section 6 coop-
erative agreement involves mainly federal funding of state protection 
programs for listed species.261 Had Congress wanted to add another 
provision for agreements with states as an alternative to listing, it 
could have done so. 
266 The Services withdrew proposals to list the Barton Springs salamander and the southern 
population of the copperbelly water snake because the existence of CAs meant they were not 
endangered or threatened. See Determination of Threatened Status for the Northern Population 
of the Copperbelly Water Snake, 62 Fed. Reg. 4183 (1997); Proposed Rule to List the Barton 
Springs Salamander as Endangered 61 Fed. Reg. 46,608 (1996) (withdrawn Sept. 4, 1996). 
266 See Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 842 
(1984). 
267 [d. at 842-43. 
268 See Pacific Legal Found., 657 F.2d at 839 (interpreting 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6». 
269 See id. (interpreting 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)I». 
260 See 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c). 
261 See id. at § 1535(d). 
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Finally, Congress limited the factors to be taken into account in 
making a listing determination to five specific factors.262 Congress did 
not intend for the agency to create a sixth, optional factor: the exist-
ence of a Conservation Agreement. Again, if Congress had wanted 
to include a sixth factor for determining endangered or threatened 
status, it could have done so. 
However, even if a court would find that Congress had not spoken 
directly on the issue of Conservation Agreements in lieu of listing, it 
would probably find that the agency's decision to use CAs is based on 
an unreasonable interpretation of the Act. If a court found that Con-
gress had not directly addressed the issue of Conservation Agree-
ments, the court would then examine whether Congress left an ex-
plicit or an implicit gap for FWS to fill.26S Here, where there is no 
mention of Conservation Agreements and indeed no mention of avoid-
ing listing through any means, a court would probably find that Con-
gress had left an implicit gap in the statute for the FWS to fill. The 
court would then defer to the agency's decision as long as it was based 
on a reasonable interpretation of the statute.264 
Here, however, a court would probably find that the decision to use 
Conservation Agreements in lieu of listing is not based on a reason-
able interpretation of the statute. Congress's first priority in passing 
the Act was to afford protections to species, above all else.266 But 
Conservation Agreements effectively place endangered and threat-
ened species in a balancing test against economic interests and com-
peting land use. The enforcement provisions of the Act were designed 
to make it possible for citizens to act as watchdogs over the agency 
and over other federal, state, and private actors.266 Yet Conservation 
Agreements make it nearly impossible for citizens to have rights to 
sue.267 The sections of the statute that the FWS relies on for authority 
are not strong enough to justify a policy that seems so clearly to 
contradict Congress's intent.268 
262 See id. at § 1533(a). 
268 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, ~ 
(1984). 
264 See id. at 844. 
266 See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 183-85 (1978). 
26fl See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g). 
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C. Conservation Agreements Violate Spirit If Not Letter of Law 
By carefully adhering to the letter of the law in a number of areas, 
the FWS makes sure that the use of Conservation Agreements is not 
subject to challenge on grounds of constitutional law or the Secre-
tary's mandatory duties under the ESA, for example. But in doing so, 
the Service creates a program that evades the spirit, if not the letter, 
of the law, by violating the intent of Congress in creating the ESA. 
In the past, FWS has evaded a sovereign immunity challenge by not 
promising explicitly to withhold further regulations of species pro-
tected by CAs, even though parties to a CA agreed that this was the 
implicit understanding (the new "assurances" policy would seem to 
open FWS up to sovereign immunity challenge). Similarly, the deci-
sions to use CAs adhere narrowly to case law that mandates that a 
decision on listing may not be based on an unimplemented promise, 
which includes dicta stating that an actual plan, though unimple-
mented, may support a listing decision.269 Likewise the Service avoids 
a court challenge on the issue of the Service's mandatory duty to list, 
by factoring the CA into the equation of threats and protections to a 
species to end up with a finding of not threatened or endangered.270 
1. Sovereign Immunity Doctrine 
According to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, an agency does 
not have the power to bind the government to a promise of no future 
regulation.271 The Supreme Court has held that a contract purporting 
to bargain away such powers is void unless the government has 
surrendered the powers to regulate in the future "in unmistakable 
terms."272 
Conservation Agreements under the Draft Guidance narrowly ad-
hered to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The promise made by 
the FWS in earlier Conservation Agreements, while understood by 
the states, perhaps, as a promise not to list, was in fact not as broad 
as a promise not to regulate.273 Instead, a typical Conservation Agree-
269 See Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Babbitt, 943 F. Supp. 23, 26 (D.D.C. 1996); Southwest Ctr. 
for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 939 F. Supp. 49, 52 (D.D.C. 1996). 
270 See Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 839 (6th Cir. 1981); Proposed Rule to List 
the Barton Springs Salamander as Endangered, 61 Fed. Reg. 46,608 (1996) (withdrawn Sept. 4, 
1996). 
271 See Fisher, supra note 1, at 391. 
272 See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982). 
273 See, e.g., CWS Agreement, supra note 107, at 2; VS Agreement, supra note 107, at 1. 
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ment read, "[i]t is the intention and expectation of the parties that 
the execution and implementation of this Agreement and the Conser-
vation Strategy will reduce potential threats to the [species] ... and 
that reduction will be considered by the Secretary when making the 
. . . listing decision.''274 Others received more definitive treatment: 
"[f1ull implementation of this agreement and the associated strategy 
will reduce threats to the [species] that warrant its listing ... as 
threatened or endangered under the ESA."275 Whatever the wording, 
FWS officials feel strongly that the government reserved its right to 
regulate in the future should the species become imperiled despite 
state protections.276 Since there was no explicit promise of withholding 
federal regulation, there could be no challenge to these Agreements 
on grounds of sovereign immunity. In practice, however, states that 
were parties to these CAs had the implicit understanding that the 
FWS was promising no future regulation, and in fact FWS officials 
estimate that only in extremely rare cases has the Service listed a 
species that was subject to a Conservation Agreement.277 Thus the 
Service has been able to achieve indirectly what it could not achieve 
directly because of the sovereign immunity doctrine. 
The new "assurances" given to private landowners, laid out in the 
Draft Policy, seem to expose FWS to challenge on sovereign immunity 
grounds.278 However, under the assurances policy, the mechanism for 
promising that no future additional responsibilities will be required 
of landowners is the granting of an incidental take permit.279 This 
policy, too, seems to narrowly evade the question of sovereign immu-
nity by allowing the agency a way to assure no future regulation to 
landowners without explicitly making such a promise. Thus, while the 
FWS technically retains the power to list a species in the future, the 
use of CAs undermines the spirit of the ESA by effectively removing 
the authority of the Service over a species that would otherwise be 
endangered. 
274 See CWS Agreement, supra note 107, at 6. 
275 See VS Agreement, supra note 107, at 1. 
275 Telephone interview with Scott Pruitt, supra note 170. 
277 Telephone interview with Susan Lawrence, supra note 10. 
275 See Announcement of Draft Policy for Candidate Conservation Agreements, 62 Fed. Reg. 
31,283 (1997). 
279 See id. 
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2. Basing a Listing Decision on an Unimplemented Promise or 
Agreement 
The FWS may be violating the statute by basing a listing decision 
on an unimplemented agreement.280 According to Southwest Center 
and Biodiversity Legal Foundation, the Service may not rely on 
promises or the future possibility of other agencies or parties imple-
menting protections for a species in making a listing decision.281 And 
in Save Our Springs, Judge Bunton held explicitly that a plan must 
be in place for two years before the Service can make a decision 
regarding its efficacy in removing threats to a species.282 In the first 
two cases, however, the court held in dicta that the existence of an 
actual plan that would protect a species to the standards of the ESA, 
as opposed to a mere promise of future action, would be sufficient for 
the FWS to halt listing procedures. These two cases were heard in 
the same court, and no appeals court has yet ruled on the matter. With 
the exception of the dicta in these two cases and the opinion of the 
District Court for the Western District of Texas in Save Our Springs, 
this issue is untested in the courts. 
Because courts have held that an unimplemented promise may not 
be a deciding factor in a listing decision, CAs allow the FWS to evade 
the spirit of the ESA by basing listing decisions on little more than 
an unimplemented promise-an unimplemented plan. It remains to be 
seen whether other courts will follow Judge Bunton's lead and de-
mand a two-year "track record" for Conservation Agreements in 
future cases. 
3. Mandatory Duty to List 
By determining that Conservation Agreements do away with criti-
cal threats to species, thereby making them not endangered or threat-
ened, the FWS avoids the mandatory duty to list commanded by the 
ESA.283 By not listing the species subject to the CAs, the FWS nar-
rowly adheres to the statute as interpreted by courts that have said 
the Secretary has an affirmative duty to list a species once it has been 
280 See Save Our Springs v. Babbitt, No. MO-96-CA-168 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 25,1997); Biodiversity 
Legal Found. v. Babitt, 943 F. Supp. 23, 26 (D.D.C. 1996); Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity 
v. Babbitt, 939 F. Supp. 49, 52 (D.D.C. 1996). 
281 See id. 
282 Save Our Springs v. Babbitt, No. MO-96-CA-168, slip op. at 18 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 1997). 
283 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1994). 
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determined to be endangered or threatened.284 Because a critical as-
pect of CAs is that they are factored in to an assessment of threats 
to a species, they work by obviating the need for listing and ensuring 
that the species is deemed not endangered or threatened.285 To make 
this final, the proposed rule is officially withdrawn with a notice in the 
Federal Register. 
By factoring a CA into the complex equation of threats and protec-
tions to a species, the FWS is able to find that an otherwise endan-
gered species is not subject to listing under the ESA. However, since 
the CA allows the FWS to find that the species is not endangered or 
threatened, the Service does not violate the mandatory duty to list. 
There can be no duty to list a species that has not been deemed 
endangered or threatened, and the FWS insulates itself from court 
challenge on these grounds as well. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Endangered Species Act was created by Congress with the 
mission of protecting species at whatever cost. Supreme Court inter-
pretations of the statute have held that Congress intended to place 
endangered species above all other priorities. The anti-environmental 
movement in the United States has gained popularity among private 
industry leaders and elected officials alike. Efforts to keep the Endan-
gered Species Act alive in the face of reauthorization battles have led 
the Department of the Interior to find creative alternatives to what 
many see as unnecessary and intrusive government regulation of 
private land. The Conservation Agreement, in use by the FWS off 
and on since 1983, is one such alternative. Conservation Agreements 
obviate the need for listing of endangered species by entering into the 
Secretary's analysis of threats to a species. A species that is subject 
to such an agreement is almost by definition not endangered, regard-
less of actual effectiveness or implementation of the plan. The FWS 
bases its authority for CAs explicitly in the ESA, yet the provisions 
cited do not provide adequate authority for an agreement that effec-
tively subverts the intent of Congress in creating the Act. A close 
284 See Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 839 (6th Cir. 1981). 
285 See Determination of Threatened Status for the Northern Population of the Copperbelly 
Water Snake, 62 Fed. Reg. 4183 (1997); Proposed Rule to List the Barton Springs Salamander 
as Endangered, 61 Fed. Reg. 46,608 (1996) (withdrawn Sept. 4, 1996). 
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reading of the provisions shows that Congress did not contemplate 
the FWS brokering private agreements with states and private par-
ties to avoid the substantive protections of the Act. Additionally, the 
decision of the FWS to use Conservation Agreements in lieu of listing 
is subject to an administrative law review under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Under Chevron, a court 
would probably find that Congress had spoken directly to the issue of 
Conservation Agreements and prohibited their use to substitute for 
listing. In the alternative, a court would probably find that although 
Congress left an implicit gap in the statute for the agency to fill, the 
agency's action was not based on a reasonable interpretation of the 
Act. Finally, the use of Conservation Agreements by the FWS evades 
the spirit if not the letter of the law. By narrowly adhering to a 
number of legal doctrines, the FWS insulates itself from challenge on 
numerous grounds while still engaging in unauthorized actions in the 
name of the federal government. 
